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Abstract. In a general economy of overlapping generations, I introduce a notion of uniform ine±ciency,
corresponding to the occurrence of a Pareto improvement with a small uniform destruction of resources
(Debreu [11]). I provide necessary and su±cient conditions for uniform ine±ciency in terms of competitive
equilibrium prices. Minimal assumptions are needed for such a complete characterization; moreover, proofs
reduce to simple and short direct arguments. Finally, I verify that uniform ine±ciency is preserved under
perturbations of the endowments, a property that has not been established for the canonical notion of
ine±ciency. Remarkably, an allocation is uniformly ine±cient if and only if a non-vanishing canonical social
security mechanism is welfare improving.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, I introduce a notion of uniform ine±ciency corresponding to the presence of a welfare
improvement with any small uniform destruction of available resources (Debreu [11]). In a general economy
of overlapping generations, I provide an equivalent characterization of uniform ine±ciency in terms of com-
petitive equilibrium prices. In particular, for nearly stationary competitive equilibria, uniform ine±ciency
occurs if and only if the implicit real rate of interest is negative in the long-run.
Several pieces of work in the literature provide conditions for e±ciency in terms of equilibrium prices in
economies of overlapping generations, inspired by the studies of Cass [9] and Benveniste [4, 5] on capital
theory. The initial characterizations of Balasko and Shell [2] and Okuno and Zilcha [14] for canonical two-
period overlapping generations economies were extended by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [12] to growing
(or declining) economies, by Chattopadhyay and Gottardi [10] to economies with uncertainty and by Burke
[6] and Molina-Abraldes and Pintos-Clap¶ es [13] to economies with heterogeneous horizons for generations.
Furthermore, in a related paper, Richard and Srivastava [15] propose a pure duality approach to economies
with the double in¯nity of individuals and commodities, clarifying its inadequacy for economies of overlapping
generations.
To the purpose of comparison, I shall brie°y present the crucial elements of the characterization established
in the literature omitting irrelevant details. In the simplest framework, an equilibrium allocation is Pareto
I am grateful to Herakles Polemarchakis, Pietro Reichlin and Paolo Siconol¯ for their valuable suggestions and comments.
I also thank participants to the 2004 PRIN Workshop held in Alghero in June 2006. Remaining errors, omissions and misun-
derstandings are my own responsibility.
1e±cient if and only if the so-called Cass Criterion holds in terms of equilibrium prices. More precisely, at a
competitive equilibrium,
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Such an equivalence obtains under rather technical restrictions on preferences referred to as conditions of
non-vanishing curvature and bounded curvature of indi®erence curves. These assumptions, which are sub-
stantially innocuous over a single individual, are to be satis¯ed uniformly across individuals of all generations.
The notion of uniform ine±ciency introduced in this note allows for a complete characterization in terms
of equilibrium prices under weaker restrictions on fundamentals than those appearing in the literature. In
fact, at a competitive equilibrium,
uniform ine±ciency of allocation if and only if liminf
t!1
kptk
kp0k + ¢¢¢ + kptk
> 0:
This only requires an hypothesis that rules out preferences converging to Leontief utilities, which is less




kp0k + ¢¢¢ + kptk






which is consistent with the fact that the set of uniformly ine±cient allocation is smaller than the set of
simply ine±cient allocations. The condition for uniform ine±ciency is equivalent to the existence of some
1 > ± > 0 such that
± ¸
kp0k + ¢¢¢ + kptk
kp0k + ¢¢¢ + kptk + kpt+1k
:
Thus, an equilibrium allocation is uniformly ine±cient if and only if the value of the (bounded and non-
vanishing) intertemporal aggregate endowment grows at a geometric rate over periods of trade.
Uniformly e±cient allocations are dually characterized by supporting linear functionals de¯ned over the
relevant commodity space, exactly as in economies with ¯nitely many individuals. However, in economies of
overlapping generations, such linear functionals might not admit any sequential representation, so preventing
their interpretation as competitive prices (see Richard and Srivastava [15]). Importantly, an equivalent
characterization fails for simply e±cient allocations. This suggests that uniform e±ciency represents the
natural extension of the canonical notion of e±ciency to economies of overlapping generations, as uniform
ine±ciency, under mild restrictions, corresponds to the canonical notion of ine±ciency in economies with
¯nitely many individuals.
An economic interest for uniform ine±ciency relies on its robustness to slight perturbations of endowments
intertemporally, that is, the set of uniform ine±cient allocations is open in the uniform topology. To the best
of my knowledge, an equivalent property has not been established (and, probably, fails) for the canonical
notion of ine±ciency.2 Policy intervention is motivated by a failure of e±ciency in competitive markets. In
this perspective, the doctrine would lack foundation if ine±ciency were to depend on the precise distribution
of endowments across individuals.
Finally, as a comparison with the established results in the literature, under some sort of bounded and non-
vanishing curvature assumptions, I verify that a uniformly e±cient allocation is not e±cient only if Pareto
1Here, as in the following discussion, pt represents the vector of (Arrow-Debreu) commodity prices prevailing in period t.
2Burke [7, 8] studies the related issue of the robustness of optimal monetary equilibrium under uniform perturbations of
endowments and preferences.
2improving trades vanish eventually. In addition, uniform ine±ciency occurs if and only if a non-vanishing
social security mechanism, consisting in a reduction of consumption in the ¯rst period for an increase in the
second period, delivers a Pareto improvement.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe a general economy of overlapping generations,
which includes the canonical cases in the literature. In section 3, I introduce the notion of uniform e±ciency
and provide some preliminary basic characterization. In section 4, I present the notion of competitive prices,
jointly with the hypotheses corresponding to those of bounded curvature and non-vanishing curvature of
indi®erence curves. In section 5, I provide a duality analysis by showing that uniform e±ciency corresponds
to supportability by means of positive linear functionals that are de¯ned on the relevant commodity space,
a closed property in the uniform topology. In section 6, which represents the major contribution of this
paper, I show that uniform e±ciency is equivalently characterized by a Modi¯ed Cass Criterion in terms of
competitive prices, under restrictions that are substantially weaker than those in the literature. Finally, in
section 7, I compare the characterization in this note with the literature, by showing that, when a uniformly
e±cient allocation fails e±ciency, then any Pareto improvement eventually vanishes over periods of trade.
All proofs are collected in the appendix.
2. Fundamentals
In¯nitely many commodities are traded by in¯nitely many individuals. The commodity space is L = RL,
where L is a countably in¯nite set of (dated and, possibly, contingent) commodities.3 There is a countably
in¯nite set G of individuals. For an individual i in G, preferences ºi on the consumption space Xi are
strictly monotone, convex and continuous (in the relative product topology), where Xi is the positive cone
of a ¯nite-dimensional vector subspace Li of L.
This rather general structure is complemented by assumptions on the indecomposability of the economy
and on the ¯nite overlapping of generations. First, the economy is indecomposable, that is, for every non-







Second, the overlapping of individuals is ¯nite, that is, for every ¯nite subset G0 of the set of individuals G,
G00 =
(






Under the maintained assumptions, by a canonical argument initially due to Balasko, Cass and Shell [3],
the economy can be represented by a sequence of generations overlapping on a single period only. Periods
of trade are T = f0;:::;t;:::g, so that the commodity space decomposes as L = ©t2T Lt, where Lt is a
3Such a space is endowed with the canonical order: z ¸ x if and only if z` ¸ x` for every ` in L. An element x of L
is positive (strictly positive) if x` ¸ 0 (x` > 0) for every ` in L. For an element x of L, x+ and x¡ are, respectively, its
positive and its negative part, so that x = x+ ¡ x¡. Also, jxj = x+ + x¡ is the absolute value. Finally, L+ = fx 2 L : x ¸ 0g
is the positive cone of L. Similar de¯nitions apply to vector subspaces of L. For an element e of L, the principal indeal
L(e) = fv 2 L : jvj · ¸jej for some ¸ > 0g is a vector subspace of L, endowed with the e-supremum norm
kvk = inf f¸ > 0 : jvj · ¸jejg:
For details, I refer to Aliprantis and Border [1].
3¯nite-dimensional vector subspace of L for every t in T .4 In addition, there is a non-trivial partition fGtgt2T
of the set of individuals G, where Gt is a ¯nite set for every t in T , such that Li is a vector subspace of L0, for
every individual i in G0, and, for every t in T , Li is a vector subspace of Lt ©Lt+1, for every individual i in
Gt+1. Reinterpreting terms, ¯nitely many commodities are traded in every period of trade t in T , represented
by the vector space Lt, and in¯nitely many generations, each consisting of ¯nitely many individuals, overlap
on a single period of trade, with generations Gt and Gt+1 overlapping only in period t in T . Clearly, such a
reduction is not unique. I shall peg one of such reductions and treat it as given throughout the analysis.
An economy is simple if Li = L0, for every individual i in G0, and, for every t in T , Li = Lt © Lt+1,
for every individual i in Gt+1. Thus, an economy is simple whenever individuals in the same generation
desire the same set of commodities. It is worth noticing that the hypothesis of a simple economy rules
out many instances of economies of overlapping generations, beginning with uncertainty if individuals are
distinguished on contingencies. It is only motivated by the need of analytical tractability and could be
substantially weakened at the cost of heavy notation and quali¯cations.5
3. Uniform Efficiency
An allocation x is an element of X =
©
x 2 LG : xi 2 Xi for every i 2 G
ª
















is a well-de¯ned element of L, as Gt is ¯nite for every t in T .
An allocation x in X is Pareto dominated by an allocation z in X whenever, for every individual i in
G, zi ºi xi and, for some individual i in G, zi Âi xi. An allocation x in X is e±cient if it is not Pareto






This canonical notion of e±ciency is weakened in order to provide a full characterization.
For a positive element e of L, an allocation x in X is e-e±cient if it is not Pareto dominated by an







Thus, an allocation is e-e±cient when a Pareto improvement is ruled out by an e-uniform small destruction
of available resources. To simplify presentation, whenever the positive element e of L corresponds to the
aggregate endowment, e =
P
i2G xi, I shall refer to an e-e±cient (e-ine±cient) allocation simply as a uni-
formly e±cient (uniformly ine±cient) allocation. Notice that the canonical notion of e±ciency corresponds
to 0-e±ciency.
Lemma 1 (Ordering in E±ciency). An allocation x in X is e0-e±cient for a positive element e0 of L only
if it is e00-e±cient for every positive element e00 of L satisfying L(e0) ½ L(e00), where, for every element e
of L,
L(e) = fv 2 L : jvj · ¸jej for some ¸ > 0g:
4An element v of L uniquely decomposes as (v0;:::;vt¡1;vt;vt+1;:::), where vt is an element of Lt for every t in T .
5For instance, instead of periods of trade T , one could consider an event-tree S of date-events.
4Uniform ine±ciency is, as a matter of fact, equivalent to robust Pareto dominance by means of a redis-
tribution of resources. This is of relevance for policy intervention, as any slight distortion in the operating
of competitive markets might still be compatible with a welfare improvement upon an uniformly ine±cient
allocation.
Lemma 2 (Robust Pareto dominance). For a strictly positive element e of L corresponding to the aggregate
endowment, in an economy with a bound on the cardinality of generations, an allocation x in X is e-ine±cient





· 0 and, for
every individual i in G, yi ºi xi for every yi in Xi with
¯ ¯yi ¡ zi¯ ¯ · ¸e.
4. Supporting Prices
A price p is an element of P, the positive cone of L, with evaluation





p ¢ x0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ xt:
Values are allowed to be in¯nite. However, a price p in P de¯nes a positive linear functional on Li for every
individual i in G.
An allocation x in X is supported by price p in P if, for every individual i in G,




for every zi in Xi. By local non-satiation of preferences, for every individual i in G,




for every zi in Xi. Also, notice that, by monotonicity of preferences, a supporting price p in P is strictly
positive.
Supportability is reinforced by stronger properties in part of the analysis.
For a positive element e of L, an allocation x in X, with supporting price p in P, is e-smoothly supported







implies zi ºi xi;
for every zi in Xi with
¯
¯zi ¡ xi¯
¯ · ¸e. In fact, smooth supportability requires that, locally, the (translated)
convex cone
n






be contained in the weakly preferred set
©
zi 2 Xi : zi ºi xiª
. This is a mild requirement for a single individ-
ual, so that the restriction is substantial only insofar as it holds uniformly for all individuals. This drawback
is common to many other characterizations of e±ciency in overlapping generations through supporting prices.
In fact, it is similar to the traditional assumption of uniformly bounded curvature of indi®erence curves.
Remark 1 (Smooth supportability). If preferences are smooth, smoothly strictly increasing and smoothly
quasi-concave, the requirement of smooth supportability is satis¯ed for every single individual at an interior
consumption plan.
5For a positive element e of L, an allocation x in X, with supporting price p in P, is e-strictly supported
by price p in P if, for some ¸ > 0, there is ± > 0 such that, for every individual i in G,








for every zi in Xi with
¯
¯zi ¡ xi¯
¯ · ¸e, where ei is the projection of e in L into Li and the norm is the
e-supremum norm. Strict supportability requires that, locally, the weakly preferred set
©
zi 2 Xi : zi ºi xiª
be contained in the convex set
n










Strict supportability corresponds to the hypothesis of non-vanishing curvature of indi®erence curves in the
literature.
Remark 2 (Strict supportability). If preferences are smooth, smoothly strictly increasing and smoothly
strictly quasi-concave, the requirement of strict supportability is satis¯ed for every single individual at an
interior consumption plan.
Both smooth and strict supportability are to hold uniformly across individuals for some element e of L.
For instance, e in L could be the unit element, e = (1;1;1;:::;1;:::), jointly with the assumption that for
some ¸ > 0, xi · ¸e for every individual i in G. Alternatively, e in L could be the aggregate endowment,
e =
P
i2G xi, jointly with the assumption of a bound on the cardinality of generations.
5. Duality
An interesting feature of the modi¯ed notion of e±ciency is that it admits an equivalent characterization
in terms of supporting linear functionals. Relevantly, such an equivalence fails for the canonical notion of
e±ciency, that is, removing the interiority assumption. In particular, an ine±cient allocation might still
admit a supporting linear functional.
For a positive element e of L, endow the vector space L(e) with the e-supremum norm, where
L(e) = fv 2 L : jvj · ¸jej for some ¸ > 0g:
Let L0 (e) denote the norm dual of L(e), that is, the vector space of all norm continuous linear functionals
' on L(e), where the duality operation is denoted by ' ¯ v for every v in L(e). An allocation x in X is












where z Â x means that allocation z in X Pareto dominates allocation x in X. In fact, for every non-trivially
positive element e of L, e-e±ciency is equivalent to e-supportability.
Lemma 3 (Duality). For a non-trivially positive element e of L, an allocation x in X is e-e±cient if and
only if it is e-supported by a linear functional ' > 0 in L0 (e). In addition, for a positive element e of L,
an allocation x in X is e-supported by a linear functional ' > 0 in L0 (e) only if it is v-e±cient for every
positive element v of L(e) satisfying ' ¯ v > 0.
6For a positive element e of L, consider the space of allocations with aggregate endowment bounded by
(some expansion of) e in L, that is,
X (e) =
(






This space of allocations is endowed with the metric induced by the e-supremum norm, so that, for every











For a positive element e of L, an allocation x in X (e) is e-robustly ine±cient if there is ² > 0 such that any
alternative allocation z in X (e) is ine±cient provided that d(z;x) < ². That is, if any slight perturbation
of that allocation, in the e-supremum norm, leads to an ine±cient allocation.
For a strictly positive element e of L corresponding to the aggregate endowment, a remarkable property
of e-ine±ciency is that, under an additional hypothesis of uniform continuity on preferences, the set of such
allocations is open in the e-supremum norm. So, if an allocation is e-ine±cient, it is e-robustly ine±cient.
For a positive element e of L, preferences are said to be e-uniformly continuous if, given any pair of
allocations (z;x) in X £ X, for every ² > 0, there is ± (²) > 0 such that, for every individual i in G,
zi ºi xi implies zi + ²ei ºi xi + ± (²)ei;
where ei is the algebraic projection of e into Li.
Proposition 1 (Robustness). For a strictly positive element e of L, in an economy with e-uniformly con-
tinuous preferences, the set of e-e±cient allocations x in X (e) is closed in (the metric induced by) the
e-supremum norm, provided that
P
i2G ei is an element of L(e).6
6. Equivalent Characterization
Supporting prices convey information about e±ciency of the allocation of resources. In fact, I shall here
provide an equivalent characterization of uniform ine±ciency in terms of supporting prices. In particular,





p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et
> 0:
In order to understand the full implications of the proposed equivalence, just assume that prices evolve
according to a steady (gross) rate of growth ± > 0, that is, for every t in T , p¢et+1 = ±p¢et, with p¢e0 = 1.
Hence,
p ¢ et
p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et
=
±t
1 + ± + ¢¢¢ + ±t¡1 + ±t = ±t 1 ¡ ±
1 ¡ ±t+1:
Therefore, as it can be easily veri¯ed, an allocation is uniform ine±cient if and only if the real rate of interest
is negative (± > 1).



















7The Modi¯ed Cass Criterion, that is used to establish equivalence, implies that, for some 1 > ± > 0,
± ¸
p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et
p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et + p ¢ et+1
holds at every t in T . Thus, the value of aggregate endowment grows at a geometric rate. It can be easily











Thus, the necessary and su±cient condition in this note is stricter than that de¯ned by the traditional Cass
Criterion, as the set of uniformly ine±cient allocations is contained in the set of ine±cient allocations.
Necessity requires no additional restriction beyond the hypothesis that, in every period of trade, the value




This requirement is satis¯ed if e corresponds to the aggregate endowment, e =
P
i2G xi.












p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et
> 0:
To obtain su±ciency, the hypothesis of smooth supportability is employed and, indeed, when smooth
supportability fails, counterexamples to the claim in proposition 3 can be easily constructed. This substitutes
for the requirement of bounded curvatures of indi®erence curves that emerged in the literature. In addition,
as the proof is constructive, the assumption of a simple economy allows for a direct control on the Pareto




t, exceed the corresponding values of ´et for some ´ > 0. This is again consistent with
the assumption that e corresponds to the aggregate endowment, e =
P
i2G xi.






t ¸ ´e; for some ´ > 0;




p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et
> 0:
The following proposition clari¯es the exact relation between competitive prices and supporting linear
functionals for uniformly e±cient allocations. In fact, supporting linear functionals correspond to some
appropriate limits of competitive prices.







t ¸ ´e; for some ´ > 0;
8in a simple economy, an allocation x in X, with e-smoothly supporting price p in P, is e-e±cient if and only
if it is e-supported by a linear functional ' > 0 in the (weak*) closure of f'tgt2T ½ L0 (e), where, for every
t in T , the linear functional 't in L0 (e) is de¯ned by
't ¯ v =
p ¢ v0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ vt
p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et
; for every v in L(e):
A ¯nal proposition shows equivalence in uniformities. In particular, if a Pareto improvement does not
obtain with a small destruction of the aggregate endowment, neither does with a small destruction of the
endowment of only commodities whose relative price does not vanish along periods of trade.







t ¸ ´e; for some ´ > 0;
in a simple economy, an allocation x in X, with e-smoothly supporting price p in P, is e-e±cient only if it






7. Comparison with the Literature
I shall here verify under which conditions uniform e±ciency is consistent with a failure of e±ciency at
equilibrium. Under a sort of curvature assumptions, it turns out that this occurs only if there is no Pareto
improvement with uniformly positive trades. Thus, every Pareto improvement eventually vanishes in the
long-period.
Proposition 6 (Vanishing welfare improving trades). For a strictly positive element e of L corresponding





xt ¸ ´e; for some ´ > 0;
in a simple economy with a bound on the cardinality of generations, an e-e±cient allocation x in X, with











° °zi ¡ xi° ° = 0;
where the norm is the e-supremum norm.
A relevant implication of vanishing trades is that the canonical social security system would not deliver a
welfare improvement upon a uniformly e±cient allocation which is not e±cient. Oppositely, when allocation
is uniformly ine±cient, a welfare improvement obtains through an extremely simple policy consisting in
transferring part of the endowment of every individual from the ¯rst period to the second period of economic
activity, remunerating such a transfer at the (corrected) real rate of interest prevailing in the market.













t ¸ ´e; for some ´ > 0;
9in a simple economy with generations of constant cardinality, an e-ine±cient allocation x in X, with e-
smoothly supporting price p in P, is Pareto dominated by the alternative allocation z in X de¯ned, for every





p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et
p ¢ et
¶





p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et
p ¢ et
¶
et; for every i in Gt+1;
where ² > 0 is su±ciently small.
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 1. Supposing not, then allocation x in X is Pareto dominated by an allocation z in X














where ¸ > 0 is such that e0 · ¸e00, which is consistent as e0 is an element of L(e00). This shows a contradiction.
¤
10Proof of lemma 2. Let be ¹ > 0 be greater than twice the cardinality of each generation, supt2T #Gt, and
let ei denote the algebraic projection of e in L into Li. If allocation x in X is e-ine±cient, then it is Pareto







Let z in X be de¯ned, for every i in G, by

























Letting ¸ = ²=¹, it follows that, for every yi in Xi with
¯ ¯yi ¡ zi¯ ¯ · ¸e, yi ¸ zi ¡ ¸ei ¸ vi, so that, by
monotonicity of preferences, yi ºi xi.
As far as the reverse implication is concerned, assuming 1 > ¸ > 1, consider the allocation y in X de¯ned,
for every i in G, by yi = (1 ¡ ¸)zi, so that
¯
¯yi ¡ zi¯
¯ = ¸zi · ¸e. Thus, allocation y in X Pareto dominates














so proving the claim. ¤
Proof of remark 1. Assume that the utility function ui : Xi ! R is smooth, smoothly strictly increasing and
smoothly quasi-concave. By supportability, at an interior consumption plan, there is ¹i > 0 such that, for
every hi in Li,
@ui ¡
xi¢
¢ hi = ¹ip ¢ hi:
At no loss of generality, assume that ¹i = 1. In addition, by Taylor Decomposition, there is ¸¤ > 0 such























Pegging any 1 > ½ > 0, I shall show that the requirement of e-smooth supportability is satis¯ed by some
¸¤ > ¸ > 0.

























¸ lying in Ki
¸ for every ¸¤ > ¸ > 0,
satisfying











































11converges to some hi in Li with
°
°hi°






















As p is strictly positive on Li, p ¢ jhj > 0, which shows a contradiction. ¤
Proof of remark 2. To verify this claim, assume that the utility function ui : Xi ! R is smooth, smoothly
strictly increasing and smoothly strictly quasi-concave utility function.7 By supportability, at an interior
consumption plan, there is ¹i > 0 such that, for every hi in Li,
@ui ¡
xi¢
¢ hi = ¹ip ¢ hi:
At no loss of generality, assume that ¹i = 1. In addition, by Taylor Decomposition, there is ¸¤ > 0 such







































° °zi ¡ xi° °2





¯ ¯zi ¡ xi¯ ¯ · ¸e
o
:
Suppose that, for every ± > 0, the set Ki





±>0, with each zi
±
lying in Ki
±. Possibly extracting a subsequence, one might assume that such a sequence converges in Xi. If
zi = lim±!0 zi















p ¢ ei · lim
±!0
±¸2p ¢ ei = 0;
as preferences are strictly convex. Hence, zi = lim±!0 zi






± ¡ xi° °
)
±>0
converges to hi in Li with
° °hi° ° = 1.
Using the de¯nition of Ki
±,

















°p ¢ ei · lim
±!0
±¸p ¢ ei · 0:
7Smoothly strictly quasi-concave means that, for every
￿
hi;xi￿
in Li £ Xi, with hi 6= 0, if @ui ￿
xi￿
¢ hi = 0, then hi ¢
@2ui ￿
xi￿
¢ hi < 0.











































±p ¢ ei +
1
2






hi ¢ @2ui ¡
xi¢
¢ hi:
This contradicts the hypothesis of smoothly strict quasi-concavity, so proving the claim. ¤











Z = fz 2 X : z Â xg \
(








Clearly, C is a non-empty convex set and, by hypothesis, C\int(¡L+ (e)) = ;. By the Separation Hyperplane
Theorem (Aliprantins and Border [1, Theorem 5.50]), there is a non-trivial linear functional ' in L0 (e) such
that, for every c in C, ' ¯ c ¸ 0. It is also clear, by monotonicity of preferences, that ' > 0, which proves
the claim as far as necessity is concerned.
As far as su±ciency is concerned, suppose not. So, there is an allocation z in X such that z Â x and, for












= ¡²e 2 int(¡L+ (e)):
Thus,







As far as the second claim is concerned, simply notice that the restriction ' : L(v) ! R is a well-de¯ned
non-trivially positive linear functional in L0 (v), as L(v) ½ L(e) and ' ¯ v > 0. ¤
Proof of proposition 1. Let X (e) =
©
x 2 X :
P
i2G xi 2 L(e)
ª
. Consider a sequence of e-e±cient allocations






¸ > 0 :
¯ ¯xiº ¡ xi¯ ¯ · ¸e
ª
= º:
By lemma 3, there is a sequence of linear functionals 'º > 0 in L0 (e) (weak*) converging, without loss
of generality, to a linear functional ' > 0 in L0 (e) (see Alaoglu's Theorem in Aliprantis and Border [1,





in L(e) such that z Â x.
Given any ² > 0, there is ± (²) > 0 such that, for every individual i in G, zi + ²ei ºi xi + ± (²)ei, so that, by





zi + ²ei ¡ xiº¢










zi + ²ei ¡ xiº¢
¸ 0;
where the left hand-side inequality follows from the fact that xiº ¡xi ¸ ¡ºei for every individual i in G. In










As ² > 0 vanishes, one obtains a proof of the proposition. ¤
Proof of proposition 2. For every t in T , let vt = (v0;:::;vt) be the truncation of v in L at t in T . By

























































¸ ¡p ¢ et:
This proves the claim, as it implies that p ¢ et ¸ ²p ¢ et for every t in T . ¤
Proof of proposition 3. For every t in T , let vt = (v0;:::;vt) be the truncation of v in L at t in T . By
hypothesis, there is 1 > ¯ > 0 such that, for every t in T ,
p ¢ et ¸ (1 ¡ ¯)p ¢ et
and, so,
1 ¸ (1 ¡ ¯)
p ¢ et
p ¢ et
¸ 1 ¡ ¯:
Using the ¯rst inequality and rearranging terms, it follows that, for every t in T ,
¯p ¢ et+1 ¸ (1 ¡ ¯)p ¢ et;
which implies




p ¢ et ¸ 1:
Choose ² > 0 and 1 > ½ > 0 so that ½(1 ¡ ²) = ¯ and let ¸ > 0 be given by the hypothesis of e-smooth
supportability at 1 > ½ > 0. At no loss of generality, assume that ´ > ¸ > 0.
The alternative allocation z in X is constructed as follows. (Notice that this is consistent as the economy
is simple, that is, for every i in G0, Li = L0 and, for every i in Gt+1, Li = Lt ©Lt+1; in addition, for every t





= ¸(1 ¡ ¯)
p ¢ et
p ¢ et
et · ¸et · ´et;




t; in addition, for every i in Gt+1,
¡
zi ¡ xi¢+








Finally, for every individual i in generation G0, let
zi = xi +
1
#G0


































¸(1 ¡ ²)(1 ¡ ¯)
p ¢ et
p ¢ et
















= ¡²¸(1 ¡ ¯)e:





































· ¸et + ¸et+1
· ¸e:
15Hence, by e-smooth supportability, zi ºi xi. In addition, by monotonicity of preferences, for every i in the
initial generation G0, zi Âi xi. This proves the claim. ¤
Proof of proposition 4. One implication is a direct consequence of the equivalence in lemma 3. So, assume




p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et
= 0:
Notice that, for every allocation z in X that Pareto dominates allocation x in X, at every t in T ¤, the








p ¢ e0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ et
:
As the value in the right hand-side of the above inequality vanishes over T ¤ and f'tgt2T ¤ ½ L0 (e) admits
an accumulation point ' > 0 in L0 (e), the claim is proved. ¤
Proof of proposition 5. Notice that, for every t in T ,
't ¯ v =
p ¢ v0 + ¢¢¢ + p ¢ vt






Because of proposition 4, allocation x in X is e-supported by a linear functional ' > 0 in the closure of
f'tgt2T ½ L0 (e) and, because of the above inequality, ' ¯ v > 0. Hence, v-e±ciency follows from lemma
3. ¤
Proof of proposition 6. As in the previous proofs, vt = (v0;:::;vt) denotes the truncation of v in L at t in T .
Let 1 > ¸ > 0 be given by the assumption of e-strict supportability and, without loss of generality, assume
that supi2G
° °zi ¡ xi° ° · ¸, where the norm is the e-supremum norm. Indeed, if not, replace the allocation














° · ¸kek = ¸:




















For every t in T , exploiting feasibility and e-strict supportability (jointly with the fact that the economy
is simple, so that, for every t in T , ei ¸ et for every i in Gt),





















































p ¢ et ¡ ´p ¢ et:
16Hence, for every t in T , one obtains
´
p ¢ et





° °zi ¡ xi° °2
:
Because of proposition 3,
0 ¸ ´ liminf
t2T
p ¢ et





° °zi ¡ xi° °2
¸ 0;





° °zi ¡ xi° ° = 0;
so proving the claim. ¤
Proof of proposition 7. Notice that, by assumptions, proposition 2 holds true. Using the notation in the
proof of proposition 3 (of which the current proof is just a simpli¯cation), there is 1 > ½ > 0 such that, for
every t in T ,




½p ¢ et+1 ¸ p ¢ et:
Let ´ > ¸ > 0 be given by the hypothesis of e-smooth supportability at 1 > ½ > 0 and let ² = ¸(1 ¡ ½). It




· ¸(1 ¡ ½)
p ¢ et
p ¢ et
· ¸ < ´:








so that zi ºi xi. Feasibility straightly obtains by the hypothesis of a constant cardinality of generations,
because of the simple structure of the reallocation. This proves the claim. ¤
17